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Greener Homes: An Ex-Post Estimate of the Cost of Carbon Dioxide Emission 
Reduction using Administrative Micro-Data from the Republic of Ireland 
 
1. Introduction 
There are many ex-ante estimates of the costs of greenhouse gas emission reduction (see, for 
example, Clarke et al., (2009)). Most of these studies assume cost-effective implementation of 
climate policy, although there are also papers that study the effect of one particular deviation from 
the first-best (see, for example, Babiker, Metcalf and Reilly, (2003)). This paper is different. It is ex-
post in that it estimates the costs of a policy that has been implemented. The paper focuses on the 
excess costs of the policy, which was designed in such a clumsy way that no academic economist 
would ever think of an ex-ante analysis of this kind of intervention. The paper is about a minor 
subsidy (for biomass heating) in a small country (Ireland) but its implications are wider than that. 
There is no reason to assume that climate policy would be designed as recommended in an 
economics textbook. As a result, emission abatement may be considerably more expensive than 
typically assumed. This paper contributes to the quantification of the excess cost. 
The European Union’s climate-and-energy package states that renewable energy should account for 
20% of the EU's final energy consumption by 2020. For Ireland, 16% of final energy consumption 
should come from renewables by 2020 (European Commission, 2011). The production of renewable 
energy must come from 3 areas: electricity, heating, and transport. The Greener Homes Scheme 
(GHS) was introduced in 2006 (and closed in 2011) with the aim of increasing the use of renewable 
energy and sustainable energy technologies in Irish homes. It thus helps Ireland meet its targets in 
the Renewable Energy Sources for Heating and Cooling (RES-H) category. The scheme provides a 
grant to domestic property owners to contribute to the initial capital cost of installing a renewable 
heating technology. Initially the scheme was available for residents of both existing and new 
dwellings; however, in July 2008 the scheme was restricted to existing homes. Between 2006 and 
2010, 31,560 households received grants under the scheme. 59% of households availing of the 
scheme installed solar thermal, 20% installed biomass stoves and boilers, 20% installed heat pumps 
and less than 1% installed wood gasification boilers. The total amount offered in grants between 
2006 and 2010 was approximately €68.4 million. Was this money spent wisely? Could the same 
money have avoided more emissions? Could the same emissions be avoided for less money? In this 
paper, we answer those questions for biomass boilers. 
We limit ourselves to biomass boilers because these replace previous heating systems. Heat pumps 
provide supplemental heat, and therefore reduce only a fraction of the carbon dioxide emissions 
from heating. That fraction is unknown to us. Solar thermal provide supplemental heat, replacing a, 
to us, unknown share of heat supply. These restrictions bias our conclusions. Ireland has a maritime 
climate with limited variation in temperature between summer and winter. Heat pumps are 
therefore not very effective. Ireland is also not optimal for solar thermal. In our analysis we ignore 
the fact that 79% of the subsidy was spent on less suited technologies. 
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The GHS is only one of the three schemes aimed at reducing emissions by changing and reducing 
energy use in the residential sector in Ireland. The Warmer Homes Scheme (WHS) aims to improve 
the energy efficiency and comfort conditions of the homes of those on low incomes. Measures 
include the installation of lagging jackets, attic insulation, cavity wall insulation, draught proofing 
and energy efficient lighting. Between 2000 and 2008, €10.9m had been allocated to the scheme 
which covered interventions in about 17,700 households (Department of Social and Family Affairs, 
2009a). The Home Energy Saving Scheme (HES) was launched in March 2009 and is available to the 
owners of all dwellings built before 2006. Grants are provided for the investment in energy efficient 
improvements such as roof insulation, wall insulation, installation of high efficiency boilers or 
improved heating controls. The energy rating of the building before and after the improvements is 
compared. Over 111,000 homes had availed of the scheme by the end of 2010 at a cost of over €47 
million (SEAI, 2011). Unfortunately, we have access to the administrative data for the GHS only. We 
therefore do not analyse the WHS or the HES, even though households are entitled to subsidies 
under both GHS and either WHS or HES. 
Besides subsidies for renewable energy technologies, Ireland levies a carbon tax on oil and gas for 
home heating. Peat and coal are exempt. The oddly designed carbon tax creates its own distortions. 
It also interacts with the GHS, incentivising those who use the cleaner fossil fuels to switch to 
biomass energy. We ignore this aspect, noting that we therefore understate the inefficiencies in the 
GHS. 
To our knowledge, we are the first to carry out an assessment of a government run renewable 
energy scheme for the residential sector in Ireland. There are a number of studies of residential 
energy use in Ireland, for example, Leahy and Lyons (2010), O’Doherty, Lyons and Tol (2008), 
O’Leary, Howley and Ó’Gallachóir (2008). Scott (1997) studied the uptake of energy-saving 
measures. Clinch and Healy (2001) conduct an ex-ante cost-benefit analysis of the retro-fitting of 
homes. The study by the Department of Social and Family Affairs (2009b) is closest to ours. It carried 
out an ex post assessment of the energy, environmental, thermal comfort and health benefits of the 
WHS. The study was based on a sample of 600 households, 257 of whom availed of subsidies under 
the WHS and 343 who did not (but who did apply). The results show that control group improved the 
energy efficiency of their houses to roughly the same degree as those that did receive a subsidy, so 
that there was no significant difference between the control and the policy group with regard to 
energy use, fuel poverty, comfort and health risks. 
There have been ex-post studies of the costs of residential emission reduction for other countries. 
Jenkins (2010) focused on a scheme that was available to fuel poor households in the UK. The 
measures considered were loft insulation, improved lighting, improved glazing, draught proofing, 
external insulation, improved boiler and refrigeration. Comparing the results of 3 previous UK 
studies, Jenkins (2010) finds that the cost of retrofitting a house, assuming that a carbon saving of at 
least 50% was achieved, varies from between £7,000 and £31,900. The annual cost of saving a tonne 
of carbon as a result of the retrofit varies between £2,252 and £10,250. Mills and Schleich (2009) 
studied the adoption of solar thermal technologies in the German residential sector. Results show 
that households can make moderate savings on energy expenditure from combined solar water and 
space heating systems. There is no evidence of savings for those households that install solar 
technologies for either space or water heating, however. There is also little evidence of differential 
4 
adoption across socio-economic groups. The authors note low adoption of solar technologies in the 
German housing market and attribute this to the fixed housing stock and the relatively low savings 
potential. Amstalden et al. (2006) analysed the profitability, from the homeowner’s point of view, of 
investing in energy efficient retrofit measures in the Swiss residential market. The authors find that 
the profitability of the investment is heavily influenced by expected future energy prices. If oil prices 
are at 2005 levels or higher, the investment in energy efficient retrofit measures would be 
profitable, even without government supports. Concerning market intervention, a combination of 
policy options such as subsidies, income tax deductions and a carbon tax would make the 
investment profitable even when oil prices are relatively low. The authors argue that subsidies alone 
would not make the investment profitable unless oil prices rise substantially. Wasi and Carson (2011) 
examine recent rebate programmes aimed at increasing the share of solar/heat pump systems for 
the purpose of residential water heating in New South Wales. Using a specifically designed survey, 
the authors collect information from home owners who have recently purchased the water heater. 
They find that the rebate programme increased the share of solar/heat pump systems by 43% for 
households who do not have access to natural gas. For those with natural gas access, the 
programme increased the share of solar/heat pump systems by 19%. It appears that the rebate 
programmes were important only for those households that deliberately set out to replace their 
water heater. The rebate program was much less effective when water heaters were replaced on an 
emergency basis. Data were also collected on a group of respondents who are likely to replace their 
water system in the near future. These data were analysed using several flexible choice models. 
Results show that there is considerable heterogeneity in preferences toward different types of water 
heaters as well as in the household discount rates. Oritz and Markandya (2009) investigated the cost 
effectiveness of different policy options to promote the use of energy efficient appliances in Europe. 
The authors analysed energy taxes, subsidies, tax credits and bans. The improvement of 
refrigerators, washing machines and boilers and the installation of energy efficient light bulbs in 4 
European countries were considered. In each case the reduction in CO2, the administrative costs and 
the welfare costs and gains were compared. The best policy response was found to depend on the 
country and on the appliance in question. In most cases, subsidies were found to be more expensive 
than energy taxes. Although subsidies tend to produce larger CO2 reductions they tend also to be 
associated with higher welfare costs. Metcalf (2009) analysed the US tax code in relation to low 
carbon technologies. He argues that subsidies are inefficient because they lower the cost of energy. 
The consumer is thus encouraged to respond in a manner that contradicts the goal of emission 
reduction. Metcalf (2009) also makes the point that it is difficult to achieve technology neutrality 
with subsidies. This argument is most relevant for the GHS where different subsidies are awarded for 
different technologies and all households are awarded a different price per tonne of carbon avoided. 
According to Metcalf (2009), the promotion of carbon free technologies should be done by 
increasing the price of carbon and not by subsidising clean-energy technologies.   
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 presents the data and methods used. The results are 
presented in section 3. Section 4 provides a discussion and conclusion.   
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2. Data and Methods 
We use the anonymised micro data for the GHS provided by the Sustainable Energy Authority of 
Ireland (SEAI). The dataset contains household information about the amount of the grant provided, 
the type of product installed, the gross cost of the installation, the size of the dwelling (in square 
feet or metres), the number of bedrooms, the type of accommodation, the county in which the 
applicant lives, the date on which the grant is provided and the fuel which is displaced. The data 
refers to all of the grants that were allocated under the scheme between April 2006 and October 
2010. In total 30,155 households received grants over this period. The demand profile for different 
technologies over the course of the scheme is displayed in Table A1. Table A2 shows the grants that 
were available at different time periods.  The average installation cost reported by applicants and 
the expected total cost of the installation, as estimated by SEAI (2010), is also displayed.  
We first estimate the subsidy in relation to the emissions avoided by each household. We restrict the 
sample to those households that availed of grants for biomass boilers and wood gasification boilers. 
In order to assess the cost of emission reduction we impute energy usage, total emissions and the 
emissions of the displaced fuel for each household in the restricted sample. For this part of the 
analysis we incorporate the anonymised 2004/05 Household Budget Survey (HBS) (CSO, 2007a) 
which is carried out on a representative random sample of private households in Ireland. 
Administered by the Central Statistics Office of Ireland, the main aim of the HBS is to determine 
household expenditure in order to update the weightings used for the Consumer Price Index. 
Detailed information is also provided on income and household facilities. In 2004/05, 6,884 private 
households participated in the survey. Households record expenditure on different fuel types over 
specified periods, as well as the volume used.1 The price of fuel follows. We then impute energy use 
for households that availed of the GHS by matching households in the HBS to households in the GHS 
based on variables that are common to both datasets: the type of dwelling, year built, the number of 
bedrooms and primary heating fuel. Each household in our sample is thus a representative of a 
group of similar households in the HBS. We estimate the emissions of each fuel type for each 
household by multiplying the quantity by its emission factor (Scott and Eakins, 2004). 
Descriptive statistics on the imputed household energy usage and emissions for the restricted 
sample are provided in Table 1. The average Irish household used 25,304 kWh of energy annually 
and emitted 8.1 tCO2; average electricity use per annum is 5591 kWh (O’Leary, Howley and 
Ó’Gallachóir, 2008).2 Table 1 shows that the households that availed of grants under the GHS are 
using more energy, more electricity and emitting more CO2 than the average Irish household. Leahy 
et al. (2010) found that electricity usage in Irish homes increases with household income. This is 
probably because wealthier households have more electrical appliances and they may use them 
more often. Households availing of the GHS use 12% more electricity than the average household. 
The average number of bedrooms for households availing of the GHS is 4.2 while the 2004/05 HBS 
                                                                                 
1  The HBS includes information on energy expenditure in new builds up to 2004/05. In order to estimate energy use and 
emissions of dwellings built after this date we apply energy usage growth factors which are displayed in Table A3. 
These growth factors are taken from Dineen and Ó’Gallachóir (2011), where the energy consumption of the average 
newly built dwelling between 1997 and 2020 is estimated. The annual growth and/or decline in the demand for space 
heating, water heating, lighting and appliances and cooking are separately estimated. 
2  In comparison, the 2004/05 HBS showed that average annual energy usage was 26,139 kWh while annual electricity 
use was 4335 kWh. (CSO, 2007a)  
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shows that the average household contains 3.4 bedrooms. Also, 95% of GHS recipients live in 
detached houses, whereas the 2006 Census shows that only 48% of dwellings in Ireland are 
detached houses (CSO, 2007b). All this indicates that GHS households are relatively rich. While it is 
encouraging that those households that emit relatively high quantities of CO2 are actively reducing 
their emissions, it also appears that the grants are being provided to relatively wealthy individuals, 
who may have invested in renewable technologies in the absence of government supports. 
Baumol (1972) showed that, in a cost-effective emission reduction policy, emissions are priced 
equally at the margin. In GHS, that is not necessarily the case. Subsidies are granted for the purchase 
of heaters and boilers, rather than for their use. Subsidies are independent of the fuel replaced, the 
size of house and its energy efficiency. While the subsidy per boiler is the same for each household, 
the subsidy per tonne of carbon dioxide avoided varies drastically. 
Therefore, in the second part of the analysis, we analyse the imposition of subsidies that are 
proportional to the emissions saved over the lifetime of the renewable technology. We assume that 
the life of biomass boilers and wood gasification boilers is 20 years and we assume that household 
emissions are reduced by the same amount each year over the 20 year period. We use a discount 
rate of 4% because this is the rate recommended for cost effectiveness analysis of public sector 
projects (Department of Finance, 2011). Using OLS regressions, we estimate the elasticity of demand 
with regard to the net cost of installations3 (i.e. the gross installation cost minus the subsidy 
received).4 We predict how households would adjust their demand in response to changes in the 
level of subsidy. We also estimate the number of households that would have availed of the 
renewable technologies even if no subsidy had been provided. We also consider more elastic and 
more inelastic price elasticities and we present the resulting changes in the level of demand. In 
addition, we present the resulting changes in the cost and emission avoidance level. 
We consider three arbitrary subsidies: €20/tCO2 (FitzGerald et al., 2008), €15/tCO2 (the carbon tax 
that was introduced in December 2009) and €30/tCO2 (the carbon tax proposed for 2014). We also 
consider “optimum” subsidies. In order to assess environmental efficiency, we derive the maximum 
amount of emissions that could have been avoided given that the budget for the scheme is €13.5 
million, assuming that each household receives the same subsidy per tCO2 avoided. Similarly, we 
examine economic efficiency by deriving the degree to which the cost of the scheme could have 
been reduced while keeping emission reduction at the current level. 
Finally, we estimate the consumer surplus that is derived under different subsidy scenarios. 
                                                                                 
3  Because the net cost is unique to each household, we group the net cost variable into bands of €500 and we log the 
median price in each band. We also log the corresponding demand in each category. Using OLS regressions, we then 
find the elasticity of demand for biomass and wood gasification boilers. 
4  Occasionally, other refurbishments were carried out in addition to the installation of the renewable technology. It 
appears that some households may have recorded the gross cost of all work done in the dwelling as opposed to the 
cost of installing the GHS technology only. In order to minimise the possibility of including incorrect estimates of the 
net cost, we omit the top 2.5% and bottom 2.5% of observations based on the net cost variable. All of the households 
for which no gross cost is reported are also omitted. The resulting sample contains 3,340 observations with the net cost 
ranging between €1,100 and €19,800. 
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3. Results 
3.1. The costs of emission reduction under the GHS 
Figure 1 shows that the cost per tCO2 avoided varies hugely across the 3,3365 households that 
installed biomass boilers. 670 households receive a subsidy of €615/tCO2 avoided and 68% of 
households get subsidies even higher than this. The costs of carbon dioxide mitigation for 
households that installed wood gasification boilers are displayed in Figure 2. 104 households in the 
restricted sample availed of these subsidies.6 15% of households that installed wood gasification 
boilers get a subsidy of €374/tCO2 avoided and 47% get subsidies even higher than this. The average 
cost of carbon dioxide mitigation is almost 38% higher for biomass than it is for wood gasification 
boilers.  
Table 2 shows that the annuitised cost of emission reduction for biomass and wood boilers, 
assuming a 20 year life-time and 4% discount rate. Note that we omit fuel costs for want of 
information. In each case the standard deviation far exceeds the mean indicating that the subsidy 
varies hugely across households. The average annual subsidy for carbon dioxide avoided by the GHS 
is far higher than the EU ETS permit price which averaged €14/tCO2 in 2010 (Point Carbon, 2011) or 
the carbon tax of €20/tCO2.   
 
3.2. Relating the subsidy to replaced emissions of the household 
Figure 3 compares the subsidies that households currently receive to the subsidies that would be 
received were they proportional to the household’s level of emission reduction. The graph shows 
that some households would receive a subsidy that is near zero because the current emission levels 
of those households are low. These households tend to use natural gas for water heating, space 
heating and cooking. The accommodation may be relatively small in size so that it is easier to heat or 
there may be fewer occupants. The accommodation may have been recently built and, therefore, 
complies with strict building regulations. Assuming all households still avail of the scheme, over 99% 
of households get a higher subsidy at present than they would if the subsidy was levied at €15/tCO2. 
1.2% of households would be better off at a subsidy level of €20/tCO2 and this figure rises to 5% for 
a subsidy of €30/tCO2. The relatively few households that benefit from an emissions related subsidy 
have very high levels of emissions at present. They tend to be larger households, the 
accommodation tends to be older and they are generally more difficult to heat. Also, they often 
employ very inefficient heating methods, such as an open fire. 
Table A4 shows the number of households that either gain or lose when the subsidy is related to the 
emissions level of the household. Results show that households receive a subsidy that is on average 
€2,912 higher than they would receive under the €15/tCO2 scenario. Only 13 households would get a 
                                                                                 
5  In total 4,139 households installed biomass boilers, however, when we restricted the sample we lost 803 of these 
observations.  
6  113 households in total received grants for wood gasification boilers; however, we omitted some of these observations 
based on the reported net cost.  
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higher subsidy if emission reduction was priced at €15/tCO2. They would gain an average of €580 
compared to the current system. Under the €20/tCO2 scenario, 98.8% of households would see their 
subsidy reduced by an average of €2595 compared to the present system but 41 households would 
gain an average of €704. At a subsidy of €30/tCO2, 174 households benefit. The remaining 
households get €2,018 more now than would be case if the subsidy was levied at €30/tCO2.  
 
3.3. Changes in demand as a result of changes in the subsidy 
It is reasonable to assume, however, that households would adjust their demand in response to a 
change in the level of subsidy. Using OLS regressions we find that the price elasticity of demand for 
biomass boilers is -0.88 (.02) and that for wood gasification boilers is -1.87 (0.11). As previously 
stated only 5% of households gain if the subsidy were levied at €30/tCO2 avoided. However, other 
high emission households may enter the scheme if the subsidy system was changed to an emissions 
related one. Similarly, households that have relatively low levels of emissions would see their 
subsidy fall and we would expect demand from these households to decrease. Table 3 shows how 
demand for the GHS changes as the subsidy changes. For presentation purposes, the table displays 
the average change in the level of demand exercised by different categories of households. There is 
large variation in the degree to which demand changes across household categories. This occurs 
because of the variation in emissions levels which, in turn, affects the degree to which the present 
value of the total subsidy awarded to each household will change.  
We also consider the degree to which the GHS is economically and environmentally efficient. In one 
scenario, we assume the budget for the scheme equals the current cost of the scheme for the 
restricted sample; €13.5 million and we simulate the maximum amount of emissions that can be 
avoided for this cost. An important assumption is that each household availing of the scheme 
receives the same subsidy per tCO2 avoided. We find that the subsidy in this case is €57.21/tCO2. We 
also investigate the degree to which the cost can be reduced while reaching the same level of 
emission avoidance. The subsidy received by households in this case is €47.43/tCO2. The number and 
profile of households availing of the scheme will change in each of these scenarios. The results are 
displayed in Table 3.  
Figure 4 displays the degree to which the cost of the scheme and level of emission reduction 
changes. We find that by changing the current subsidy to one which is based on the emissions level 
of each household, the cost of the scheme can be reduced by €2.3 million and 17,383 tCO2 can still 
be avoided per annum. On the other hand, if the budget of the scheme is €13.5 million, 1,679 extra 
tonnes of carbon dioxide could be avoided each year by making the subsidy payment efficient. These 
points are displayed in red in Figure 4. 
In the absence of any subsidy at all, 1,829 households would still have installed renewable energy 
technologies in their homes and the resulting level of emission avoidance would have been 9,239 
tCO2 per annum. The subsidies given to these households totalled over €7 million. Consequently, the 
budget of €13.5 million is only contributing to a reduction of 8,144 tCO2 per annum rather than 
17,383. As explained earlier, emission reduction could be increased by 1,679 tCO2 annually by 
changing the way the subsidy is awarded. Thus, the scheme is only 8,114/ (8,114+1,679) = 83% 
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environmentally efficient. Regarding efficiency of exchequer spending, the same level of emission 
reduction could have been achieved for €11.2 million. Therefore, the scheme is only 11.2/13.5 = 83% 
economically efficient. The government overspends 17%. 
Above, we treat each household in the GHS as a representative of a group of households in the HBS. 
Recall that energy use and emissions of households in the GHS were estimated based on the average 
energy usage and emissions levels of a group of similar households in the HBS. As a sensitivity 
analysis, we aggregate the GHS population into 32 groups, and use the group’s average as the 
representative household. Groups were chosen based on the subsidy received, the type of 
accommodation and the number of bedrooms. The yellow points in Figure 4 show the results. The 
black points reflect the results that were derived when the GHS population was aggregated into 52 
groups. This reveals the effect of heterogeneity on efficiency. The degree to which emission 
reduction can be increased for the same cost and the extent to which costs can be reduced for the 
same level of emission avoidance increases as the number of groups increases. 
As another sensitivity analysis, we varied the price elasticities. We separately estimated the price 
elasticity for each of the 8 types of household outlined in Table 3. We then carry out the cost and 
emission reduction analyses on the restricted sample using the most extreme elasticities.7 The 
resulting changes in demand for the scheme, the cost of the scheme and the level of emission 
reduction are presented in Table 4.  
When demand is more elastic than it is in the base case, a small change in the level of subsidy can 
have a big effect on the number and type of households availing of the scheme. When demand is 
inelastic, the cost of the scheme is reduced substantially to €8.6 million while the same level of 
emission avoidance is reached. The subsidy in this case is €36.30/tCO2. At this price, low emission 
households see a relatively large fall in the total subsidy they receive, but because demand is 
inelastic, the total number of households availing of the scheme falls only slightly. High emission 
households are always encouraged to avail of the scheme when the subsidy is emissions related. 
Thus, the same level of emission reduction is reached for a much lower cost. With inelastic demand, 
the level of emission reduction only increases slightly because households do not adequately adjust 
their demand in response to an increase in the level of the subsidy. When demand is elastic, 
emission reduction reaches a higher level of 21,111 tCO2 per annum. If no subsidy is provided and if 
demand is elastic, no households avail of the scheme. However, if demand is very inelastic, there will 
be a slight increase in demand for the scheme compared to the present system. 
 
3.4 Consumer Surplus 
We measure the level of satisfaction that consumers derive from the GHS by estimating each 
household’s consumer surplus.8 Consumer surplus is the difference between the price a consumer is 
willing to pay and the price she actually pays. We do not have the information required to estimate 
producer surplus. 
                                                                                 
7  We also carried out the analysis using the upper and lower bound of the standard error for the elasticities used in the 
base case, however, standard errors were small and the analysis was not very informative.  
8  Recall that we have data on the boiler, but not on fuel use. 
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We estimate the consumer surplus under the current system of subsidisation as well as in the 
scenarios in which the scheme is environmentally or economically efficient. Some statistics are 
displayed in Table 5. The total consumer surplus is highest when environmental efficiency is 
maximised. The average consumer surplus is also highest in this case but the standard deviation is 
large. This happens because the subsidy is emissions related. High emission households will benefit 
compared to the current system but low emission households will not. Both the total and average 
consumer surpluses are higher under the current system than in the case where economic efficiency 
is maximised. This happens because economic efficiency results in fewer households availing of the 
scheme and some households would receive lower subsidies than they do under the current system.  
Table 5 also shows the subsidies and the net social gain (abstracting from the producer surplus). The 
current GHS generates a consumer surplus of €17.5 mln at a cost to the exchequer of €13.5 mln. 
There is a net gain of €4 mln. However, without a subsidy, the net gain would be €7.2 mln. The GHS 
thus destroys welfare. An economically efficient subsidy would generate a net gain of €4.7 mln – still 
loss-making. Adding the environmental benefits9 hardly changes the results. Comparing the current 
subsidy with the best subsidy (none), economic efficiency is 58%. 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, we present an ex-post estimate of the cost of carbon dioxide emission reduction using 
administrative micro-data from the Greener Homes Scheme in the Republic of Ireland. The GHS 
subsidizes the purchase of heating systems that use renewable energy. We focus on biomass and 
wood gasification boilers. The subsidy is independent of the amount or type of fuel replaced. The 
subsidy per tonne of carbon dioxide avoided therefore varies considerably between households. We 
use the data to estimate price elasticities and construct a simulation model that we use to optimize 
the subsidy. We find that it is possible to achieve the same emission reduction with 17% less 
exchequer spending; and that is possible to achieve 17% more emission reduction for the same 
subsidy. 53% of the emissions avoided by bioenergy boilers would have been avoided without any 
subsidy. Although the subsidy has benefits for consumers and the environment, this comes at a cost 
to the exchequer; the subsidy reduces welfare by 42%. 
The Greener Homes Scheme is a small subsidy in a small country. The total costs and avoided 
emission are therefore small. The relatives are substantial, however. It could well be that other 
greenhouse gas emission reduction programmes in other countries are just as badly designed as the 
Greener Homes Scheme. And there are a number of factors we have left out of the analysis. First, we 
focussed on bioenergy boilers, omitting the larger but probably less effective subsidies for heat 
pumps and solar thermal. Second, we ignore the interaction of the subsidy for renewable heat with 
the subsidy for home insulation and the carbon tax on oil and gas. Third, we do not consider the lack 
of coordination of the bioenergy subsidies with other instruments to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions and promote renewable energy. Fourth, we ignore the interactions of the renewable heat 
subsidy with other taxes (excises, VAT). Therefore, ours is an underestimate of the true inefficiency. 
                                                                                 
9  Carbon dioxide is valued at €15/tCO2, the shadow price of carbon set by the EU ETS. €15/tCO2 is close to 
the central estimate of the social cost of carbon for a 1% pure rate of time preference (Tol, 2009). 
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Besides highlighting the suboptimal design of one particular aspect of climate policy in one particular 
country, the paper also shows that administrative micro-data can be used for an ex-post evaluation 
of policy interventions. Studies like these should be conducted for other programmes and other 
countries so that we can obtain an estimate of the costs of actual emission reduction policy. 
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Table 1.  Household energy use, electricity use and emissions in the GHS 
 Household energy use (kWh) 
Household 
electricity use 
(kWh) 
Household 
emissions 
(tCO2) 
Emissions of 
replaced fuel 
(tCO2) 
GHS Subsidy 
(€) 
Total 102,905,990 21,499,594 62,938 17,383 13,515,600 
Average 29,915 6,250 18 5 3,929 
Standard 
deviation 4,388 1,372 4 2 586 
Min 13,372 0 4 0 2,000 
Max 47,796 9,647 29 17 4,200 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics: Biomass Boilers and Wood Gasification Boilers 
 Biomass boilers Wood gasification boilers 
Number of installations 3,336 104 
Total amount in grants (€) 13,307,600 208,000 
Average subsidy (€/tCO2)
a 316 227 
Standard deviation (€/tCO2)
 a 1,929 1,179 
Minimum cost (€/tCO2)
 a 5 4 
Maximum cost (€/tCO2)
 a 14,841 7,067 
Median cost (€/tCO2)
 a 30 13 
a Annual cost discounted at 4% over 20 years 
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Table  3. Changes in demand by different categories of households as a result of changes in the subsidy 
House type and 
number of 
bedrooms 
Current System €0/tCO2 for 20 years 
€15/tCO2 for 20 
years 
€20/tCO2 for 20 
years 
€30/tCO2 for 20 
years 
Same level of 
emission 
avoidance for 
reduced cost 
Increased level of 
emission avoidance 
for same cost 
 Subsidy Uptake Uptake 
change 
in 
uptake 
Uptake 
change 
in 
uptake 
Uptake 
change 
in 
uptake 
Uptake 
change 
in 
uptake 
Uptake 
change 
in 
uptake 
Uptake 
change 
in 
uptake 
Detached 1/2 
2000 2 0.8 -59% 1.1 -47% 1.2 -42% 1.3 -34% 1.6 -20% 1.8 -12% 
2500 1 0.8 -22% 0.9 -14% 0.9 -11% 0.9 -5% 1.0 5% 1.1 10% 
3000 6 4.2 -30% 4.5 -24% 4.6 -23% 4.8 -19% 5.2 -14% 5.4 -10% 
4200 40 14.1 -65% 16.6 -59% 17.4 -56% 19.1 -52% 21.9 -45% 23.6 -41% 
Detached 3 
2000 12 6.7 -44% 8.9 -26% 9.6 -20% 11.0 -8% 13.5 12% 14.8 24% 
2500 14 11.0 -21% 12.2 -13% 12.7 -10% 13.5 -4% 14.9 7% 15.8 13% 
3000 49 34.3 -30% 38.0 -22% 39.2 -20% 41.6 -15% 45.8 -6% 48.2 -2% 
4200 325 160.6 -51% 187.6 -42% 196.7 -39% 214.7 -34% 246.1 -24% 263.8 -19% 
Detached 4 
2000 46 27.1 -41% 36.4 -21% 39.5 -14% 45.6 -1% 56.4 23% 62.4 36% 
2500 47 35.7 -24% 39.8 -15% 41.1 -13% 43.8 -7% 48.5 3% 51.1 9% 
3000 254 180.5 -29% 208.2 -18% 217.4 -14% 235.8 -7% 268.0 6% 286.0 13% 
4200 1524 756.2 -50% 969.1 -36% 1040.1 -32% 1182.0 -22% 1429.4 -6% 1568.2 3% 
Detached 5 
2000 29 17.6 -39% 24.3 -16% 26.5 -8% 31.0 7% 38.8 34% 43.2 49% 
2500 26 20.1 -23% 22.1 -15% 22.8 -12% 24.1 -7% 26.4 1% 27.6 6% 
3000 94 68.8 -27% 76.6 -18% 79.2 -16% 84.4 -10% 93.5 -1% 98.6 5% 
4200 603 296.5 -51% 362.7 -40% 384.7 -36% 428.8 -29% 505.6 -16% 548.8 -9% 
Detached 6/7 
2000 11 7.2 -35% 10.2 -8% 11.2 2% 13.2 20% 16.7 51% 18.6 69% 
2500 9 7.4 -18% 8.2 -8% 8.5 -5% 9.1 1% 10.0 11% 10.6 17% 
3000 18 13.2 -27% 15.5 -14% 16.2 -10% 17.7 -2% 20.3 13% 21.7 21% 
4200 144 72.3 -50% 97.3 -32% 105.7 -27% 122.3 -15% 151.4 5% 167.7 16% 
Detached 8 or 
more* 
2000 2 1.4 -32% 1.7 -17% 1.8 -12% 2.0 -1% 2.3 16% 2.5 26% 
3000 1 0.8 -22% 0.8 -16% 0.9 -15% 0.9 -11% 1.0 -5% 1.0 -1% 
4200 11 7.0 -36% 8.0 -27% 8.3 -25% 8.9 -19% 10.1 -9% 10.7 -3% 
Semi d/terraced 
1/2/3 
2000 1 0.4 -62% 0.4 -62% 0.4 -62% 0.4 -62% 0.4 -62% 0.4 -62% 
2500 4 3.2 -21% 3.4 -15% 3.5 -14% 3.6 -10% 3.9 -3% 4.0 0% 
3000 10 6.9 -31% 7.4 -26% 7.6 -24% 8.0 -20% 8.7 -13% 9.1 -9% 
4200 56 27.4 -51% 30.7 -45% 31.8 -43% 34.0 -39% 37.9 -32% 40.0 -29% 
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House type and 
number of 
bedrooms 
Current System €0/tCO2 for 20 years 
€15/tCO2 for 20 
years 
€20/tCO2 for 20 
years 
€30/tCO2 for 20 
years 
Same level of 
emission 
avoidance for 
reduced cost 
Increased level of 
emission avoidance 
for same cost 
Semi d/terraced 
4/5/6 
2000 2 1.2 -38% 1.7 -14% 1.9 -7% 2.2 9% 2.7 36% 3.0 51% 
2500 1 0.9 -12% 0.9 -6% 1.0 -4% 1.0 1% 1.1 9% 1.1 13% 
3000 8 6.0 -24% 6.6 -18% 6.7 -16% 7.1 -12% 7.6 -4% 8.0 0% 
4200 90 38.4 -57% 49.8 -45% 53.6 -40% 61.2 -32% 74.4 -17% 81.8 -9% 
Total uptake  3440 1829  2252  2392  2674  3165  3440  
*No households in this category were given a subsidy of €2500 
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Table 4. Cost and emission scenarios under different price elasticities 
PED  €/tCO2 
Annual 
emission 
reduction 
(tCO2) 
Total cost (€) Household demand 
Wood: -
1.87, 
Biomass -
0.88 
Current System Various 17,383 13,515,600 3,440 
 
Same level of emission 
avoidance for reduced 
cost 
47.43 17,383 11,205,686 3,165 
 
Increased level of 
emission avoidance for 
the same cost 
57.21 19,061 13,515,600 3,440 
 No subsidy 0 9,239 0 1,829 
 €15/tCO2 15 11,814 3,543,636 2,252 
 €20/tCO2 20 12,673 4,724,848 2,392 
 €30/tCO2 30 14,390 7,087,272 2,674 
Wood: -2.3, 
Biomass -
2.23 
Same level of emission 
avoidance for reduced 
cost 
48.36 17,383 11,423,738 2,772 
 
Increased level of 
emission avoidance for 
the same cost 
57.21 21,111 13,515,600 3,387 
 No subsidy 0 - 2,972 0 - 587 
 €15/tCO2 15 3,342 3,543,636 455 
 €20/tCO2 20 5,447 4,724,848 802 
 €30/tCO2 30 9,656 7,087,272 1,497 
Wood: -
1.01, 
Biomass -
0.04 
Same level of emission 
avoidance for reduced 
cost 
36.30 17,383 8,575,600 3,419 
 
Increased level of 
emission avoidance for 
the same cost 
57.21 17,659 13,515,600 3,461 
 No subsidy 0 16,906 0 3,346 
 €15/tCO2 15 17,103 3,543,636 3,376 
 €20/tCO2 20 17,169 4,724,848 3,386 
 €30/tCO2 30 17,300 7,087,272 3,406 
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Table 5. Welfare analysis.  
 CS: No subsidy CS: Current system 
CS: 100% 
Economically 
Efficient 
CS: 100% 
Environmentally 
Efficient 
Consumer surplus (€) 7,245,831 17,519,686 15,893,294 18,254,751 
Average surplus (€/h) 2,106 5,093 4,620 5,307 
Standard deviation  (€/h) 1,531 1,855 3,731 4,427 
Cost  (€) 0 13,515,600 11,205,686 13,515,600 
Economic gain  (€) 7,245,831 4,004,086 4,687,608 4,739,151 
Emissions (tCO2/yr)
a 9,239 17,383 17,383 19,062 
Welfare gain (€) 7,384,416 4,264,831 4,948,353 5,025,081 
a Emissions are valued at €15/tCO2.  
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Figure 1. Cost per tCO2 avoided per household: Biomass Boilers  
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Figure 2. Cost per tCO2 avoided per household: Wood Gasification Boilers  
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Figure 3. Comparison of subsidy options  
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Figure 4. Changes in cost and emission reduction resulting from subsidy changes 
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Table A1. Demand for renewable technologies under the Greener Homes Scheme 
Technology 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 Freq Cost €000s Freq 
Cost 
€000s Freq 
Cost 
€000s Freq 
Cost 
€000s Freq 
Cost 
€000s 
Air Source heat 
pump 308 1,232 364 1,360 269 537 72 145 26 52 
Horizontal ground 
collector heat 
pump 
1,549 6,661 1,034 4,160 590 1,475 42 105 14 35 
Vertical ground 
collector heat 
pump 
505 3,280 563 3,439 335 1,178 43 144 5 18 
Water (well) to 
water heat pump 43 187 46 187 37 93 7 18 1 3 
Biomass Boiler 2,411 10,100 1,215 4,930 454 1,323 49 123 10 25 
Biomass Stove 362 399 360 396 218 212 141 113 37 30 
Biomass Stove 
with back boiler 272 490 146 263 109 177 64 90 23 32 
Wood Gasification 
Boiler - - - - 46 92 59 118 11 22 
Solar Evacuated 
Tube - - 330 396 2,317 2,800 2,152 2,606 902 1,056 
Solar Flat Plate - - 675 902 3,496 4,597 1,832 2,368 1,026 1,270 
Solar Thermal for 
Hot water and 
space heating 
191 451 177 411 1 2 - - - - 
Solar Thermal for 
Hot water only 2,026 3,266 3,189 5,022 1 2 - - - - 
Total 7,667 26,065 8,099 21,465 7,873 12,485 4,461 5,828 2,055 2,542 
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Table A2. Greener Homes Scheme grants 2006 – 2010 
Technology  Subsidy  Year 
Average 
installation 
cost 
Standard 
deviation 
Installation 
cost 
estimated by 
SEAI 
Air Source Heat 
Pump  €4,000 Apr 2006 - Oct 2007 €14,955 €7,772 
 €12,000 - 
€13,000  
 €2,000 Oct 2007 -2010    
Horizontal Ground 
Collector Heat 
Pump 
€4,300 Apr 2006 - Oct 2007 €18,358 €7,048  €13,000 - €15,000  
 €2,500 Oct 2007 - 2010    
Vertical ground 
collector heat pump €6,500 Apr 2006 - Oct 2007 €21,940 €9,344 
€18,000 - 
€21,000 
 €3,500 Oct 2007 - 2010    
Water (well) to 
water heat pump €4,300 Apr 2006 - Oct 2007 €16,898 €7,604 
€12,000 - 
€14,000 
 €2,500 Oct 2007 - 2010    
Biomass Boiler €4,200 Apr 2006 - Oct 2007 €9,553 €5,264 €10,000 - €16,000 
 €3,000 Oct 2007 - Aug 2008    
 €2,500 Aug 2008 - 2010    
Biomass Stove €1,100 Apr 2006 - Aug 2008 €3,127 €31 €2,000 - €5,000 
 €800 Aug 2008-2010    
Biomass Stove with 
back boiler €1,800 Apr 2006 - Aug 2008 €5,587 €3,400 
€4,000 - 
€6,000 
 €1,400 Aug 2008-2010    
Wood Gasification 
Boiler €2,000 July 2008 - 2010 €10,720 €3,967 
€10,000 - 
€16,000 
Solar Evacuated 
Tube 
€300 per m2                       
(to max.6m2 ) 2006 - 2010 €5,915 €2,861 €800 - €1,300 
Solar Flat Plate €250 per m
2                       
(to max.6m2 ) 2006 - 2010 €6,505 €3,112 €800 - €1,300 
Solar Thermal for 
Hot water and 
space heating 
€300 per m2                       
(to max.6m2 ) 2006 - 2010 €10,694 €6,508 €800 - €1,300 
Solar Thermal for 
Hot water only 
€300 per m2                       
(to max.6m2 ) 2006 - 2010 €7,016 €4,612 €800 - €1,300 
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Table A3. Growth factor in energy use for new builds compared to 2005 
Year Adjustment factor: electricity Adjustment factor:  space heating  
Adjustment factor: 
 Total Energy  
2009 1.43 0.55 0.71 
2008 1.38 0.81 0.89 
2007 1.29 1 1.03 
2006 1.19 1.01 1.04 
2005 1 1 1 
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Table A4. Subsidy options 
  Current Subsidy  €15/tCO2* €20/tCO2* €30/tCO2* 
Total cost (€) 13,515,600 3,543,636 4,724,848 7,087,272 
Average per household (€) 3,929 1,030 1,374 2,060 
Standard deviation (€) 587 457 610 915 
No of households that 
gain from emissions 
related subsidy 
13 41 174 
Average gain (€)  580 704 925 
No of households that 
lose  from emissions 
related subsidy 
3,427 3,399 3,266 
Average loss (€)  2,912 2,595 2,018 
*We assume that the appliance lasts for 20 years. Prices are discounted at 4%. 
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